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A WORD OF INTRODUCTION
Somewhere some poor bloke looked at a radar screen and thought he saw
something and knew that if he hesitated a thousandth of n second his own country would be wiped ofl the face of the earth. So he p w h d a button and the
world went crazy.
This is the explanation given in the film On the Beach
for the start of the Third World War. A piece of fiction? It could be; but many
scientists and military men have said that the fear of SURPRISE ATTACK has
become so strong in the minds of some that a flo'ck of geese flying in front of a
radar screen would be enough to set the retaliatory mechanism in motion. The
fear of surprise attack- is a real danger, both in the United States and in the
Soviet Union, as David Singer points out in the article from The Notion reprinted below. It is time for us all to face this danger, to recognize, 'end to do
something about it.

...

One man's suggestion for something to do about the whole problem of
armaments, of which surprise attack is only a part, is contained in "Alternatives
to the Arms Race," reprinted on page 9 of this pamphlet.

SURPRISE ATTACK
b y Ja David Singer
DURING THE current wave of eu-

.

phoria which seems to have gripped
the world in the wake of the Khrushchev and Eisenhower "journeys
to peace," it may be in poor taste to
speak publicly' of surprise nuclear
attack, but it may also be that it is
just such a period asathis which most
requires a rather brutal analysis of
Soviet-American relations. Even before the journeys - symbolic expressions of the peace-urge - were
made, many were contending that
military technology had in a sense
made itself obsolete, and that the
destructive power of the nuclear mis-

sile was so great as almost to guarantee that it would never be used.
Man's faith in this "balance of terror" is touching, but is also indicative of the basic human tendency
to deny the existence of dangers
too great to be comprehended and
too complex to be analyzed. One is
reminded of superstitious villagers
living on the slopes of a volcano or
in the possible path of an avalanche.
On the basis of a current study of
Soviet and Western military strategy,
this writer believes that the danger of
surprise nuclear attack - in either
direction - is as great, if not great-

er, now and for the next several
years than it has been a t any time
since the cold war began. Let me
try to summarize the evidence.
FIRST of all, the two military coalitions are still very much in a state
of mutual hostility, and while there
is increasing evidence that each desires to restrict the resultant conflict and competition t o the nonmilitary realm; little has happened
to hasten the elimination of violence.
More precisely, as long as each side
retains its capacity for military attack, the other must assume that
such capacity might be utilized. As
I suggested in an earlier article
("New Hope for Disarmament," The
Nation, Oct. 10, 1959), "each elite
will inevitably equate the other's
military capaiility- with his military
intention^." Since most Americans
find it almost impossible to believe
that the Soviet could honestly fear
an attack initiated by ourselves, let
.us first examine the situation as it
looks to the Kremlin.
At the outset, there is the orthodox Communist ideology which
has consistently postulated that the
64capitalist camp" is inexorably compelled to seek the destruction of the
"Socialist camp." Sometimes it is
argued that the attack will come
when the "imperialists" are powerful enough to carry it out successfully and with little fear of retaliation.
Other times the argument is that it
will come when the West sees that
"Socialist victory" is almost inevitable, and strikes out in a last, desperate
effort to stave off defeat.
From the Soviet viewpoint. this
classic Leninist-Stalinist doctrine is
supported by some significant historical experiences. The expeditionary forces - with American contin-

gents
- which were landed in Russia
following the First World War have
been co~tinuallyinterpreted-rightly or wrongly-by
~ o i i e tleaders as
abortive attempts to overthrow the
Bolshevik regime by violent intervention. Similarly, the jockeying of
England, France and the United
States during the late 1930s was interpreted b; the Russians, then as
now, as an effort to drive the Nazis
and the Soviets into a war of such
mutual destructiveness that the
Western powers could then step in
at the end and divide up the spoils,
thus obliterating Bolshevism at little
loss to themselves. (That this was not
an altogether unfounded notion may
be established by reference t o Western actions and communications of
the period.) Even the delay in opening the second front during World
War I1 has been viewed by the Soviet as further evidence of ill will
on the part of their wartime allies.
TURNING to the present, there is
an even stronger basis for the Kremlin's fear of surprise attack. Despite
our protestations, they see the Western air bases on their periphery not
as defensive or even retaliatory sites,
but as springboards for aggression.
For example, the IRBM sites in
England, Italy and Turkey have
been and are being built above
ground, with little attention paid t o
their protection. And while our purpose in building them in this fashion
was primarily t o achieve speed and
economy, the Soviet strategist interprets the decision differently. If, he
reasons, the West established the
sites only for retaliatory purposes,
they would have been more adequately protected; since they were
not, it must follow that they are
designed for launching a surprise,

strike-first blow, after which what
happens to them becomes unimportant. I n sum, if the function of
these launching sites is indeed merely to retaliate, would they have
been left so vulnerable as to endanger their retaliatory capability?
Furthermore, the entire military
posture of NATO is such as t o encourage the Kremlin in its suspicions
of Western intentions. All of the
normal accouterments of a purely
defensive effort have been undersupported in Europe and elsewhere;
no real effort has been made to match
the Warsaw nations in ground troops
or conventional weapons. Conversely, Ileaviest emphasis has been upon
strategic air power which, the West
argues, is for purely retaliatory purposes. But since the same capability
can be used for both strike-first and
strike-back missions, the Soviet must
operate from the less naive interpretatlon.
Thus, the general outlines of the
Western military posture are such
as to engender a high degree of fear
in Soviet ranks, particularly when
coupled with the not infrequent
threats' uttered by high-ranking
U.S. political and military officers.
There is a tendency in the West
t o discount the fears of attack articulated by the Kremlin as propaganda designed to defame the United
States and its allies. But two recent
scholarly studies of Soviet military
strategy, despite sharp disagreements
on other points, come t o the same
conclusion- on this one. I n War and
the Soviet Union, Herbert Dinerstein notes that when Tank Marshal
Rotmistrov argues (in Military
Thought, February, 1955) that surprise attack plays "an important
part in the strategy of the United
States and Great Britain," the So-

viet Marshal is reflecting the "official Soviet appraisal." And in Soviet
Strategy in the Nuclear Age, Raymond Garthoff likewise concludes
that "the dominant Soviet image
of American military strategy is a
massive, surprise air blow with weapons of mass destruction."
All in all, there seem to be several
excellent reasons for Soviet strategists to assume the probability of a .
Western-initiated surprise attack.
TURNING the coin over, do we
find the same sort of fear on the
Western side? And if so, is the fear
equally justified? Without belaboring the arguments which' are all too
familiar to Americans, the answers
must likewise be in the affirmative.
Soviet behavior in Eastern Europe,
the Middle East and Asia since
World War I1 all lead to an image
of aggressiveness. I n addition, there
are the repeated Soviet references
to inevitable "showdown" and ultimate "Socialist victory," coupled
with similar assertions in the still
unrepudiated writings of Lenin and
Stalin. There is also the increasingmilitary power and technical prowess exhibited by the USSR in recent
years. The Soviet now has, or soon
will have, enough ICBMs to carry
out a successful massive attack upon
Western Europe and North America.
Their submarine fleet is now estimated to be about 500-600 strong,
with perhaps a hundred of them
able to launch an IRBM from the
relative safety of the ocean's depths.
Thus, i t would seem that there is
a t least as much justification for
fear of massive surprise attack on
the part of Western strategists' as
among their opposite numbers in the
USSR. And we have not yet dealt
with some of the more subtle forces

-that make even greater the legitimacy of this reciprocal fear.

ONE SUCH force today is that of
military technology and its dramatic
impact upon the role of time in
strategy. This takes two forms, each
equally ominous. The first has to
do with the speed with which one
side can deliver a stunning blow
upon the other. In the pre-World
War I days, a surprise attack of any
significant magnitude was almost
impossible; reserves had to be mobilized and rail transportation converted to military purposes. Even in the
pre-World War I1 era, destructiveness could arrive no sooner than the
200 or so miles per hour limit imposed by the aircraft of the day,
and - assuming a state of near
alert - there was always the ability
to counter any attack with defensive
craft and AA fire. But in the waning
days of that war, the German V-2
ballistic missile gave us the forewarning of things to come. Here a
weapon of considerable magnitude
could be delivered from fifty miles
away in a matter of minutes. More
to the point, it could not be detected
until on its final, downward trajectory, seconds before it landed on its
target; and there was almost no way
of intercepting it. Had the Nazis
been able to produce the V-2 six
months sooner, and to increase its
range earlier, the Axis might well
have come out victorious.
Today, each side has land- and
sea-based IRBMs with ranges up to
1,800 miles, capable of delivering
ar
at speeds
megaton n ~ ~ c l e warheads
up to Mach 15 (fifteen times the
speed of sound), and the USSR already is believed to possess a "significant" number of operational ICBMs,
with about a hindred launching

sites, and ranges up to 6,200 miles.
The warning time is even less than
that for the V-2, interception is
currently impossible, and destructive power staggering. Either side
could destroy most of the other's
industrial and population centers,
as well as its retaliatory military
bases, with less than twenty minutes'
warning time and with little chance
of effective defense. The strategic
impact of such a surprise attack is
so great that it could conceivably
lead to military victory in less than
twenty-four hours.
The mutual awareness of such a
possibility makes the situation more,
rather than less, dangerous. Realizing the implications of a successful
surprise attack upon itself, each side
assumes that the other must be considering it. Thus begins the vicious
psychological cycle which leads in
turn to consideration of both preventive and pre-emptive attacks. If
the planners on one side become convinced that the other is about to
strike first, they have little choice
but to try beating the adversary to
the punch. Suppose that Western
intelligence agencies begin to piece
together enough evidence to persuade them (correctly or not) that
the Soviet is planning such a strike
in late October, as soon as the harvest is in. The natural response is to
strike first. Suspecting that this is
the Western decision, the Soviets
(even if they had not originally intended a first strike) must now decide, in turn, to forestall this tragedy
by getting in the first strike themselves. And so it goes, until one side
or the o ~ h e r precipitates nuclear
World War 111 through a "preventive" attack.
Even more likely, however, is the
stumbling into war by what is called

a "pre-ernptive" strike. Here .one
side or the other picks up enough
radar information (via Dewline or
backscatter technique) t o convince
them that an attack has just been
launched. Again, this information
may or may not be accurate, but the
risks of waiting are so great that
a "counterattack" must be launched
instantaneously. By error or miscalculation, this "retaliatory" blow
may turn out to be, instead, a strikefirst rather than a strike-back blow.
This highly unstable situation is
made even more perilous by the
second form which the impact of
technology upon time may take.
Here reference is to the fear of
rnajor technological "breakthrough."
Suppose, for a realistic example,
that Western strategists become
convinced that the Soviet is on the
verge of producing a successful antimissile device. With such a breakthrough, the Kremlin could be assured of delivering a devastating
blow to the United States or Europe
while suffering far less damage from
a retaliatory blow. This might well
tempt Khrushchev to exploit his
enormously significant, if temporary,
advantage. And even if it did not
have this effect, United States or
NATO strategists might well assume that i t did. Thus the West
might decide to strike first.
These are not the ungrounded
fears of the paranoid, but rather
the kind of calculations which do
and should take place daily in military and political circles on both
sides. Not that either side wants nuclear war. T o the contrary, each
wants desperately to avoid it, but
the exigencies of the situation and
the way in which the strategists have
responded to these exigencies suggest that current and recent Soviet-

Western behavior can only make
lnore likely this nuclear holocaust.

AWAKE of the dead-end which the
constant and reciprocal increase of
retaliatory fire power may lead to,
those who make and study national
strategies have recently begun to
explore some 'new alternatives. This
exploration is characterized by a
degree of intellectual sophistication
which would jar those who still believe in the "military mind" stereotype. The strategist of today, in the
West or in the Soviet bloc, reads
more, thinks ,more and writes more
regarding the complexities of his profession; and while few can be said t o
have developed the requisite broad
view of international politics, most
have become far more rigorous and
systematic in their analyses. It may
be small comfort for those of us
outside the decison-making ranks,
but this trend does at least promise
greater accuracy in predicting the
other side's response.
Having said this, we move on to
some of the less obvious and less
traditional techniques which are now
under consideration.
One approach, currently much in
vogue, is to attempt t o make one's
retaliatory capability not only more
powerful, but less vdnerable. One
way of doing this is to move missilelainching sites underground, with
greater protection via reinforced
concrete, etc. Such sites could then
be capable of launching a devastating counter-blow even after a surprise attack, unless they received
direct hits. But as guidance systems
improve (and they are being improved rapidly) ,direct hits can be
anticipated with increasing certainty,
and it will merely be a matter of
putting a
enough warhead
on the missile to penetrate the pro-

tection given the retaliatory site.
Furthermore, the greater the destructiveness of the warhead, the
less need there is for accuracy: a
near miss by a five-megaton warhead
is just as effective as a direct hit
with one megaton. So the underground site may merely encourage
the building of bigger warheads.
And, of course, installation costs
and building time are much greater
for protected or underground sites.
Another way of decreasing the
vulnerability of one's retaliatory
power is to shift from fixed to mobile
missile sites; trailer trucks, railroad
cars, naval vessels and submarines
all come under this category (with
the last-named getting most of the
attention). Again, the idea is that
by making retaliatory sites more difficult to detect, the potential aggressor will be deterred by the knowledge that no matter how sweeping
and saturating his first strike is,
most of the retaliatory force will
survive to deliver a speedy reprisal.
Here the prospects are somewhat
brighter, but they should not be exaggerated. Not only do the same
arguments regarding fixed "hard"
sites obtain, in that the larger weapon can destroy without a direct hit,
but other considerations also enter.

IT IS naive to think that, as some
have argued, the submarine is "virtually undetectable.'' Underwater detection techniques are improving
quite rapidly, and i t is probably
only a matter of time before the seas
will be just as susceptible to electronic monitoring as are the skies today. And the irony is that the same
NATO people who are convinced
that the USSR cannot hope to operate effectively underseas against the
Western ASW (anti-submarine war-

fare) system also believe that U.S.
submarines can maneuver and fire
with near impunity.
Finally, the number of missilelaunching submarines necessary t o
present an effective deterrent retaliatory force is well into the hundreds,
considerably beyond what either side
has or is willing to build in the next
few years. And since only a nuclearpowered submarine can stay underwater for any long period of time
and thus avoid rapid detection both sides would have to multiply
many times over the handful of Polaris or Golem-equipped vessels now
in operation.
Thus, a mobile and evasive retaliatory force may have some likelihood of deterring a surprise attack,
but it cannot be viewed as even approaching a solution of the problem.
Still another approach to surprise
attack, and one gaining increasing
prominence, is in the area of passive,
or civil, defense. If, it is contended.
each side can protect most of it;
population from destruction by cornhining an effective early-warning
system with a large number of fallout shelters, the other will be able t o
do less damage and thus be less
inclined to strike first. Here is one
of the more fatuous lines of reasoning to emerge from the distorted
world of the cold war. For clearly,
as long as no serious civil-defense
program exists on either side (and
this is certainly the case today),
there is that much less inclination
on each side to beIieve that the
other is planning a nuclear strike.
Conversely, such a program, once
launched, might well persuade the
other that the motivation is to protect industrial and military workers
from retaliation after striking the
first blow. In a sense, unprotected

-

civilians are a highly persuasive indication of peaceful intent, and each
side may well regard the other's exposed population as a hostage t o
peace. Furthermore, almost any
shelter system can be partially compensated for by stepping up the size
and radioactivity of the warheads
employed. There may be a good case
for civil defense, but it has yet t o be
made, and as a deterrent to surprise
attack it makes no sense at all.

1

LET US turn now from the threat-

of-reprisal as a deterrent t o surprise
attack to some less known, but perhaps more promising, techhiquei. If,
as has been suggested, the real danger lies not in a cold-blooded decision t o instigate World War I11 by.
unprovoked surprise nuclear attack,
but in its launching by accident and
miscalculation, our efforts should be
in the direction of reducing the
chance of miscalcuIation. This in
turn requires that each side have
more information about the other's
intentions and behavior, rather than
less. The primary objective here is
to have each side as certain as -possible that the other is not planning
a surprise strike, and that any "evidence" to the contrary be quickly
and credibly rejected. The same
holds true of information tending to
persuade one side that the other has
already Zaunchcd, or not launched,
an attack.
Now it is clear at the outset that
no amount of verbal protestation by
one sicre or the other will be sufficient for these purppses. The fear
and suspicion sown by fifteen years
of cold war is too deep. A more reliable and authentic assurance is
required, one which can be relied
upon to inform not only when at-

tack or plans for attack are under
way, but when they are not under
way. That is, any reliable monitoring- system must b e equally able t o
supply negative as well as positive
believable information.
In the present transition period
from aircraft to missile delivery, how
can these requirements be met? T o
be more precise, how can each side
know that those radar blips are
birds and not planes, commercial
and not military craft, meteors and
not missiles? How can each know
that those SAC flights are for training and not attack, or that an atomic explosion was a civilian accident
and n o t a military strike? Moreover, not only must both countries
know the truth, but there must be
assurance that each .knows that the
other knows it. Otherwise country
A, fearing that country B will "retaliate" in ignorance, may itself be
tempted to strike first, after all. And
what about the so-called "catalytic
strike" launched upon one or both
sides by a third party which calculates a gain for itself out of a SovietWestern war? As long as there is
no agreement on a test ban, and nuclear weapons threaten to proliferate, this
will become hcreasingly pressing.

IT WOULD appear that a combination of techniques is essential if the
necessary information is to be communicated rapidly and reliably. First,
there must be some form of aerial
inspection as originally outlined in
thd Eisenhower "open ski.es" proposal. Inspection aircraft must be
flown on a round-the-clock basis,
at a variety of altitudes, over Western, soviet-and in-between territory.
Equipped with closed-loop TV,infrared cameras, radar, stabilized bi-

noculars and long-distance racliotransmission equipment, these craft
could provide much of- the needed
negative information promptly, accurately and continuously. As the
national satellite programs (such as
Project Samos) develop, satellites
could gradually replace the manned
aircraft. In addition, the "back-scntterm technique revealed by Project
Tepee could be employed. This is a
technique for detecting a flying missile by observing the ionization of
the air in its wake. There is also under development a promising new
"over-the-horizon"
radar system
known as Madres.
Parenthetically, even if no agreement for avoiding
- surprise attacks
is negotiated in the near fi~ture,
the West would be wise - if unorthodox - to share its missilemonitoring information with the
Warsaw Pact states. This would be
one more way of giving hem a greater warning time, hence a longer response time, and thus reduce any
temptation for them to launch a
tot ally unnecessary pre-emptive
strike. Likewise, the side which first
a solid-fuel missile propellant ought to make it available t o
the other. Since the count-down time
for solid-fueled missiles is less than
for the liquid~fueled, they can be
held back for a longer period, giving
more time to determine whether the
opponent has in fact mounted an attack.
Beyond all this, it would probably
be essential to station observers on
the uground at some fraction of each
side's launching sites, and in their
aircraft and submarines. And it may
well be that for each side to reveal
to the other the positions of its of-

fensive-retaliatory weapons (there
is little difference), would actually
increase rather than decrease its security: its launching sites would
then become hostages to its own
good faith.
Regardless of where the observers
are posted, they must be provided
with an independent and reliable
communication network connecting
all observation teams with key
strategic command posts on each
side. It is estimated that at least a
thousand observers would be needed; preferably they should be recruited from U.N. personnel of neutral nationality,
some from each
of the two blocs involved.
The problems are great and the
considerable innovations, political
and, technological, necessary for solutions may not be forthcoming. And
even the institution of a reasonably
reliable scheme against surprise attack would not provide the final
answer to the present terrifying armaments race. There is far more to
it than this. But any system which
can break through the current stalemate; help stabilize the balance of
terror, and perhaps set the precedent
for a subsequent attack on weapons-testing, production and deployment, can only be welcomed. And as
important as the atom-testing ban
and political settlement may be, the
prevention of surprise attack is by
far the most urgent issue. It should
be given top priority, both in the
political councils and research laboratories of the world. Time is mot on
the side of mankind.
J.

DAVID Sln'GER is teaching Po-

litical science at the University of
Michigan

Reprinted with p e r h s w n of the author and
issue of THENATION.
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ALTERNATIVES TO THE ARMS RACE DRASmC BUT THINKABLE
by

W. H.Ferry
The following letter was written to the Santa Barbara
News-Press by W . H. Ferry, Vice-president of the Fund for
the Republic. It appeared in the January 13, 1960 issue of
the News-Press and is reprinted here with permission of
the editor.

Editor, News-Press: When one says that war is unthinkable, it
must be taken as a literal statement, i.e., nuclear war cannot be
thought about. We have no vocabulary, no recourse to imaginaticin
sufficient to deal in logical terms with the prospect of 60 or 70 million
American corpses, to say nothing about the carnage accompanying
a nuclear attack, and to say nothing of the effects of radiation lingering over generations.
Perhaps this is one reason why all current assessments of the
impasse between Russia and the United States end up in the same
sterile and hopeless formula: Arms and yet more arms.
In commenting on the reports of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund
and the Stanford and Johns Hopkins research groups your editorial
(Jan. 8) comes to the same fruitless conclusion, that since we cannot
think of mything else to do, let us continue with all speed to make
bombs,gas, germs, rockets, missiles and submarines.
Suppose we were to go in the other direction? Suppose we were
to junk all of our weapons of whatever kind? Suppose we were to tell
the world that we are doing-so because we are convinced that it is
the only practical way out of the fateful dilemma in which all are
caught?
The best possible result of such a decision is that it would give
us the unquestioned moral leadership of an apprehensive world, that
Russia would follow our example because of its declared eagerness
to compete and surpass on grounds other than anned might, and that
all could turn to the solution of humanity's pressing problems.
The worst possible result is that Russia would instantly take
advantage of our defenselessness to bomb the U.S. into radioactive
rubble. In this case we would not be worse off than if we had engaged
in a two-way war. All that would be lacking would be a regret among

survivors that we had not had vengeance on our attackers. But this
result seems wholly unlikely. It may better be supposed that Rusk
does not desire the extinction of the US. but its su'lnnissm
a
nation and great production center to CommAnother and more possible result then is that this country would
be taken over by the Reds, cornmissass replacing our managers and
mayors, legislators and union offiicials, broadcasters and publishw.
(We m a y dso presume similar action in those countries of Western
E m p e and elsewhere for which our arms are said to provide a
shield.) This is a desperate and repellent vision; and while I do not
believe that this would be the outcome, it % necessary to accept it
as a possibility if one is willing to argue that unilateral clhrmame;nt
is the only practical policy for this country to adopt. Red domination
of this and other free nations is at least "thinkable." We can at feast
imagine it in all its hateful and dismal aspects, while we fmd the
consequences of a nuclear, germ, and gas war unfhhkable and unimaginable. We would survive as a nation with the greatest of
traditions and with the unquenchable intention of demonstrating by
argument and peacable resistance the power of freedom and justice
as man's best and only proper organizing principles.
It might well take years or decades to regenerate f d m and
justice. But we would have the chance to do so, a chance that by
common agreement would not be vouchsafed us in the case of an
all-out war which no nation could win. Should war come the task
would not be resisting or throwing off the hand of an oppressor by
reasonable means; it would be the task of rebuilding civilization from
barbarism and chaos.
It is said that we a n now following the only feasible road in
seeking disarmament with ironclad agreements on inspection. This is
not the "middle road" it is claimed to be, for the preparations for
war continue without let-up. This argument contakw, moreover, fatal
fallacies. Inspection cannot be devised that will give *lute
assurance against manufacture or stockpiling of lethal weapons. Highly
productive countries like the U.S. and Russia will always be able
to maintain facilities for making such axms, convertible almost overnight from peacetime industry. An inspection system is institutionalized distrust, and as fragile as any understanding so based.
The alternatives are drastic and repugnant in the highest degree.
But the important point is that there is an alternative to our present
policy.
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...
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